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Abstract 
A Collision Avoidance for Airport Traffic 
(CAAT) concept for the airport Terminal 
Maneuvering Area (TMA) was evaluated in a 
simulation study at the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA) Langley Research 
Center.  CAAT is being designed to enhance surface 
situation awareness and provide cockpit alerts of 
potential conflicts during runway, taxi, and low 
altitude air-to-air operations.  The purpose of the 
study was to evaluate pilot reaction to conflict events 
in the TMA near the airport, different alert timings 
for various scenarios, alerting display concepts, and 
directive alerting concepts.  This paper gives an 
overview of the conflict detection and resolution 
(CD&R) concept, simulation study, and test results. 
Introduction 
The Next Generation Air Transportation System 
(NextGen) concept for the year 2025 and beyond 
envisions the movement of large numbers of people 
and goods in a safe, efficient, and reliable manner [1, 
2].  NextGen will remove many of the constraints in 
the current air transportation system, support a wider 
range of operations, and deliver an overall system 
capacity up to three times that of current operating 
levels.  Emerging NextGen operational concepts [3], 
such as four-dimensional trajectory (4DT) – based 
airborne and surface operations, equivalent visual 
operations, and super density arrival and departure 
operations, represent a different approach to air 
traffic management and as a result, a dramatic shift in 
the tasks, roles, and responsibilities for the flight 
deck and Air Traffic control (ATC) to ensure a safe, 
sustainable air transportation system. 
NASA has initiated a Collision Avoidance for 
Airport Traffic (CAAT) research topic to develop 
technologies, data, and guidelines to enable conflict 
detection and resolution (CD&R) in the Terminal 
Maneuvering Area (TMA) under current and 
emerging NextGen operating concepts.  The goal of 
CAAT is to provide an additional, protective safety 
layer of CD&R for NextGen TMA operations.  
CAAT builds on substantial NASA research and 
testing for surface operations situation awareness and 
runway incursion conflict detection and alerting (i.e., 
the Runway Incursion Prevention System) [4, 5, 6, 
7]. 
CAAT concepts use cockpit display designs to 
promote surface situation awareness and add 
associated CD&R concepts for safety assurance.  The 
concepts employ continual own-ship and traffic data 
monitoring and algorithms to detect conflicts on the 
runway, at low altitudes near the airport, and during 
taxi operations.  Indications and alerts create 
awareness of traffic in the event that TMA safety or 
operational conditions may warrant flight crew 
response. 
A piloted simulation study was conducted to 
evaluate initial CAAT concepts for NextGen, 
including pilot reaction to conflict events for runway, 
taxi, and low altitude conflict scenarios; variations on 
alert generation timing; indication and alerting 
display concepts; and directive alerting concepts.  
This paper will present an overview of the CD&R 
concept, simulation study, and test results. 
System Description 
Simulation Facility 
Flight Deck Simulator 
This research was conducted in the Research 
Flight Deck (RFD) simulator at NASA Langley 
Research Center (Figure 1). The simulated aircraft 
dynamics model was a medium to long-haul 
commercial passenger aircraft. The RFD 
configuration is a fixed-based, dual-pilot simulator 
with a collimated 200º panoramic out-the-window 
scene. Operations were conducted at the Chicago 
O’Hare International (ORD) airport.  The out-the-
window scene included realistic taxiways and 
runways with appropriate markings, airport lighting, 
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and other aircraft in various simulated 
weather/lighting conditions. The visual acuity of the 
out-the-window scene provided approximately 20/40 
visual acuity.  The RFD was equipped with a 30º 
horizontal x 24º vertical field-of-view stroke-on-
raster head-up display located on the left or captain’s 
side. 
As shown in Figure 1, the simulator had four 
large main instrument panel displays referred to as: 
(left to right) Pilot’s Primary Flight Display (PFD), 
Pilot’s Navigation Display (ND), Co-pilot’s ND, and 
Co-pilot’s PFD.  The four display panels were Liquid 
Crystal Displays with 13.25” x 10.5” viewable space 
at 1280 x 1024 resolution. 
 
Figure 1.  RFD Flight Deck 
Two Electronic Flight Bags (EFBs) were 
installed.  Each provided a display resolution of 1024 
x 768 pixels over a 10.4” diagonal area. The EFBs 
were mounted above and outboard of the sidestick 
control inceptors.  The EFB was used as a flight 
crew’s interface for ATC data-link communications 
(i.e., Controller-Pilot Data-Link Communications, 
CPDLC) and electronic airport maps and charts. 
An ATC environment was simulated using 
auditory and data-link messages for own-ship 
instructions.  The ATC messages were triggered 
based on specific events and timings to coincide with 
the task scenario. 
Traffic data was integral to the CAAT concepts.  
Traffic data was “broadcast” at a 1 Hz rate, loosely 
mimicking an Automatic Dependent Surveillance-
Broadcast (ADS-B)-In environment.  However, no 
latency in traffic position or imprecision was added.  
Own-ship position data was updated at a 50 Hz rate.  
Stationary and moving traffic were simulated to 
represent a heavy traffic flow in the airport 
environment. 
Flight Deck Displays 
The PFD, ND, and Engine Indication and Crew 
Alerting System display (EICAS) were modeled after 
current state-of-the-art production aircraft.  Additions 
from this baseline were made to accommodate CAAT 
surface and airborne traffic and route awareness. 
Primary Flight Display 
The PFD included an ATC message area (i.e., 
CPDLC message area; Figure 2) on the outboard 
third of the display unit showing incoming and 
outgoing ATC data-link communications in textual 
format.  Incoming messages were color-coded green 
while outgoing messages were white. All messages 
were time-stamped.  The captain’s inboard display 
unit showed navigation and EICAS displays. 
 
Figure 2.  Primary Flight Display 
Head-Up Display 
The Head-Up Display (HUD) surface operations 
concepts evolved from Taxiway Navigation and 
Situation Awareness (“T-NASA”) research [8] and 
Runway Incursion Prevention System [9].  The HUD 
showed current ground speed in digital format, the 
current taxiway, next cleared taxiway, and centerline 
markers for the cleared CPDLC-assigned route. 
Navigation Display 
The Captain’s inboard display was split, 
showing a half-screen moving map navigational 
display and Engine Indication and Caution Alerting 
System.  The first officer’s inboard display was a 
full-screen moving map navigation display when 
airborne, which automatically transitioned to an 
airport surface map display (described below) after 
landing (i.e., when the ground speed was less than 80 
kts).  The runway inset display was always shown. 
Surface Map Display 
The surface map display (Figure 3) was an 
enhanced version of the track-up navigation display. 
Surface and airborne traffic icons were shown 
using ADS-B In data. The design largely reflects 
current Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics 
(RTCA) Special Committee (SC)-183 working group 
findings with regard to element shape and color 
assignments. The traffic icons were displayed as 
medium tan chevrons when on the surface and cyan 
when airborne.  The own-ship icon was a large white 
chevron.  
Own-ship’s cleared taxi route was graphically 
depicted in magenta.  The taxi route was also written 
at the bottom of the surface map with the current 
location highlighted in magenta.  The Evaluation 
Pilots (EPs) could change the map scale as desired 
with a lowest setting of 0.5 nm. 
An inset runway display was rendered on the 
right side of the first officer’s surface map display.  
The destination runway was presented in “runway 
heading up” orientation with a fixed scale that 
showed the entire runway and surrounding taxiways.  
 
Figure 3.  Surface Map Display 
Indications and Alerts 
Traffic conflict indications and alerts were 
added to the surface map and HUD as described in 
detail below. 
Indications and alerts were implemented based 
on concepts developed by RTCA SC-186 Working 
Group (WG)-1, called Enhanced Traffic Situational 
Awareness on the Airport Surface with Indications 
and Alerts (ATSA SURF IA).  This WG is 
developing an application description for flight deck-
based indication and alerting of traffic conflicts in the 
runway environment.  The application description 
was not finalized during study planning; therefore, 
the definition of indications and alerts as specified in 
a draft version of the document [10] were utilized. 
Indications 
Indications are intended to generate pilot 
awareness and situation assessment by highlighting 
the runway and traffic status as relevant to own-ship 
operations.  Indications identify normal operational 
conditions to the flight crew that are generally 
relevant for runway safety but could be a precursor to 
a non-normal situation [11].  Two types of 
indications were defined. 
Traffic indication (TI) highlights a potential 
runway traffic collision/hazard that may emerge in 
the near future.  TIs are intended to increase the flight 
crews’ awareness of the relevant runway traffic.   
A TI was indicated on the surface map (Figure 
4) by an enlarged traffic symbol for the relevant 
traffic surrounded by a blue and white dashed circle, 
an identification tag that showed flight ID and ground 
speed in knots, and a blue and white dashed line 
around the relevant runway, if applicable.  A status 
message (“Traffic”) was displayed on both the 
surface map and HUD.  In the event the traffic 
symbol was not displayed on the surface map due to 
the current map scale setting, an off-scale symbol 
was pegged on the edge of the display in the direction 
of the traffic. 
 
Figure 4.  Surface Map showing Traffic Indication 
Runway status indication (RSI) identifies if the 
runway that own-ship is approaching or using is in-
use or occupied by other traffic and is not suitable for 
entering, takeoff, or landing.  Before proceeding, the 
crew should ensure they have the appropriate 
clearance and the indicated traffic is not a factor. 
A RSI was displayed on the surface map and 
HUD in the same manner as a TI except on the 
surface map, the relevant runway outline and circle 
surrounding relevant traffic was a solid blue line. 
Auditory annunciations are not used in 
conjunction with indications. 
Alerts 
Alerts identify to the flight crew a potential 
collision hazard which may require timely response 
to avoid a collision.  A two-level alerting scheme was 
employed. 
Caution alerts are generated for conditions that 
require immediate flight crew awareness and 
subsequent flight crew response. 
A caution alert was indicated on the surface map 
(Figure 5) by an enlarged yellow traffic symbol 
surrounded by a yellow circle for the relevant traffic; 
an identification tag that showed flight ID, ground 
speed in knots, and distance between the own-ship 
and traffic in nautical miles (nm) when greater than 1 
nm and in feet when below 1 nm; and a yellow line 
around the relevant runway, if applicable.  On the 
HUD, a circular target designator symbol highlighted 
the conflict traffic (Figure 6).  An alert message 
(“Caution, Traffic”) was displayed on the HUD and 
also at the bottom of the surface map in yellow text.  
An off-scale symbol was displayed if the traffic was 
outside of the HUD or surface map viewing area. 
An aural annunciation was simultaneously 
transmitted over the flight deck speakers saying 
“Caution, Traffic.”  
Warning alerts are generated for conditions that 
require immediate flight crew awareness and 
immediate flight crew response. 
A warning alert was indicated in the same 
manner on the surface map as for a caution alert, 
except the warning was associated with the color red, 
a square was used to surround the traffic symbol, and 
the alert message was “Warning, Traffic”  (Figure 7).  
A square was also used for the target designator 
symbol on the HUD. 
 
Figure 5.  Surface Map showing Caution Alert 
 
Figure 6.  HUD showing Caution Alert 
 
Figure 7.  Surface Map showing Warning Alert 
Target 
Designator 
Symbol
An aural annunciation was simultaneously 
transmitted over the flight deck speakers saying 
“Warning, Traffic.”  
Directive Alerting 
Directive alerting was also tested.  Directive 
alerts were designed to specify to the flight crew the 
action to take to resolve a conflict situation.  The 
directive alert, dependent on scenario, was as 
follows:  “go around” when on approach, “abort” 
when departing, “stop” when taxiing or rolling-out, 
and “climb” when air-to-air conflict on approach.  
The directives were displayed on the surface map and 
the HUD, analogous to the warning and caution 
alerts, with the directive also transmitted over the 
flight deck speakers. 
Conflict Detection 
The indications and alerts were driven from the 
Airport Traffic Collision Avoidance Monitor 
(ATCAM).  ATCAM identifies potential traffic 
conflicts at low altitudes near the airport, on the 
runway, and during taxi and ramp operations for 
multiple classes of aircraft and surface vehicles. 
ATCAM is comprised of three separate aircraft-
based algorithms that rely on traffic state information 
obtained from ADS-B In: 
1.  The Runway Safety Monitor (RSM) is 
designed to detect and alert for runway conflicts.  
RSM monitors own-ship and traffic located in a 
three-dimensional virtual zone around the relevant 
runway using own-ship and traffic state data and 
separation and closure rate to determine whether an 
alert should be generated.  RSM is described in detail 
in [12]. 
2.  The Low Altitude Conflict Monitor (LACM) 
is designed to detect and alert for air-to-air conflicts 
near the airport at altitudes below 1000 ft (i.e., not 
conflict with the Traffic Alert and Collision 
Avoidance System, TCAS).  LACM computes 
closing speed, time to closest point of approach, time 
to co-altitude, and other data between own-ship and 
approaching aircraft to determine if criteria and 
thresholds are met for issuing alerts, similar to the 
TCAS approach. 
3.  The Taxi Conflict Monitor (TCM) is 
designed to detect and alert for ground taxi conflicts 
in the airport movement areas.  The TCM design is 
similar to that of LACM and computes distances 
between own-ship and traffic, closing speeds, time to 
closest point of approach and other parameters. 
The three algorithms are independent but are 
integrated and share data to increase the probability 
of detection for all possible conflicts during airport 
operations.  RSM has been through extensive testing 
[4, 5, 6, 7]; however, LACM and TCM are in the 
development stage [13].  Green, et al [14] provides a 
detailed description of ATCAM including initial 
alerting criteria. 
Test Method 
Data collection occurred for several different 
scenarios and test conditions as described below. 
Test Scenarios 
Runway, taxi, and low altitude air-to-air conflict 
scenarios were evaluated.  Every effort was made to 
produce similar timing for the scenarios; however, a 
certain amount of variability was naturally introduced 
due to the maneuvering conducted by the EP (i.e., 
deceleration rate, taxi speed, etc.). 
Runway Scenario - Arrival / take-off hold 
This scenario tested the incursion where an 
aircraft was in position and holding for departure 
clearance while another aircraft was approaching the 
same runway for a landing.  Own-ship was on 
approach to Runway 10, initially at 4 nm from the 
threshold at 1330 ft above field level (AFL), 
descending with an indicated airspeed of 138 kts.  
The EP was cleared to land.  The traffic was initially 
at the Runway 10 hold line nearest to the runway 
threshold.  The traffic taxied into position on the 
active runway at the start of the test trial and held in 
that location. 
Runway Scenario – Departure / taxi 
This scenario tested the incursion where an 
aircraft is on departure and another aircraft crosses 
the runway.  Own-ship was in position-and-hold on 
Runway 10 awaiting departure.  The traffic was 
holding on Taxiway F at Runway 10.  The EP was 
cleared for departure.  Once the EP initiated 
departure, the traffic crossed the runway. 
Runway Scenario - Taxi / departure 
This scenario tested the same situation where an 
aircraft is on departure and another aircraft crosses 
the runway.  In this instance, however, own-ship was 
initially on Taxiway T12 as if it just exited Runway 
14R.  The traffic was located in position-and-hold, 
awaiting Runway 10 departure.  The EP taxied at 15 
kts and was cleared to taxi to Concourse H via T12, 
T, F and cleared to cross Runway 10.  When the own-
ship was 900 ft from Runway 10, the traffic began its 
departure. 
Runway Scenario – Roll-out / taxi 
This scenario tested the situation where one 
aircraft lands and is rolling out while another aircraft 
crosses the runway ahead of the roll-out traffic.  
Own-ship was approaching Runway 10 and was 
cleared to land.  Traffic was holding on Taxiway F at 
Runway 10.  As the own-ship touched down, the 
traffic crossed the runway. 
Runway Scenario - Departure / departure 
intersecting runway 
This scenario tested the situation where aircraft 
are departing on intersecting runways, heading 
toward the intersection.  Own-ship was in position-
and-hold on Runway 14L awaiting departure.  The 
traffic was in position-and-hold on Runway 22R.  
Own-ship was cleared for departure.  As own-ship 
began its departure, the traffic began its departure. 
Taxi Scenario – Traffic ahead 
This scenario tested the situation where an 
aircraft exhibits excessive closure on traffic from 
behind.  Own-ship was taxiing on Taxiway T toward 
Runway 14R at a ground speed of 25 kts  The traffic 
was also taxiing on Taxiway T toward Runway 14R 
ahead of the own-ship but at 15 kts ground speed. 
Taxi Scenario – Traffic head-on 
This scenario tested the situation where two 
aircraft conflict head-on on a taxiway.  Own-ship 
landed on Runway 28 and was cleared to taxi to 
Concourse E via T, A9.  Traffic was taxiing on 
Taxiway T toward Runway 28.  A conflict occurred 
on Taxiway T between Taxiways T10 and M. 
Taxi Scenario – taxi / taxi 
This scenario tested the situation where aircraft 
conflict at a taxiway intersection.  Own-ship landed 
on Runway 22R and was cleared to taxi to Concourse 
C via C, B, A5 and cleared to cross Runway 27L.  
Traffic was parked at the gate at Concourse C.  As 
own-ship was taxiing on Taxiway B, traffic began to 
exit the ramp on Taxiway E, ahead of own-ship, 
causing an intersection conflict. 
Air-to-air Scenario – Arrival / crossing traffic 
This scenario tests the situation where traffic 
crosses the path of an aircraft on final approach.  
Own-ship was on approach to Runway 22R, initially 
at 4 nm from the threshold at 1330 ft AFL at an 
indicated airspeed of 138 kts.  Traffic (a helicopter) 
was traveling at heading 130, 0.75 nm short and 1.2 
nm North of the Runway 22R threshold at 300 ft 
AFL and at an indicated airspeed of 50 kts.  As own-
ship approaches, the traffic crossed own-ship’s path. 
Evaluation Pilots 
Thirty-six pilots served as EPs, creating 18 flight 
crews.  Each pilot flew for a major U.S. air carrier 
and was paired by airline to ensure crew coordination 
and cohesion in standard operating procedures.  The 
Captains had an average of over 14,000 flight hours.  
The first officers had an average of over 10,000 flight 
hours.  All pilots had “glass cockpit” experience.  
During Phase One testing (see below), the Captain 
served as the pilot flying and the First Officer served 
as the monitoring pilot (pilot-not-flying).  During 
Phase Two testing, the roles were reversed, with the 
First Officer serving as the pilot flying and the 
Captain serving as the pilot-not-flying.  The flight 
crews were asked to maintain good crew resource 
management and comply with company-specific 
procedures. 
Test Matrix 
The testing was conducted in two phases.  In 
Phase One, pilot reaction to conflict scenarios were 
evaluated.  Sixteen trials were conducted.  The 
conflict scenarios were interspersed among nominal 
trails to provide sufficient variety and task demands 
to reduce expectation on the part of the EP.  Two 
alert conditions (alerting and no alerting) were 
evaluated in a “between subjects” design (i.e., half of 
the EPs received alerts during conflict events).  No 
indications were used.  Trial 10 was the taxi/taxi 
conflict, Trail 12 was the low altitude air-to-air 
conflict, and Trial 14 was the roll-out/taxi runway 
conflict.  These test trials were conducted in low 
visibility (1220 ft runway visual range (RVR)).  The 
final trial in this test phase (Trial 16) evaluated pilot 
response to a nuisance alert using a slightly modified 
runway conflict-departure/taxi scenario.  As own-
ship was departing on Runway 10, traffic taxied up to 
but did not cross the hold line on Taxiway F.  The 
ADS-B position data, however, indicated that the 
traffic had crossed the hold line.  The surface map 
indicated that the traffic was approaching the runway 
and for half the runs, an alert was generated.  This 
test trial was conducted in 8000 ft RVR so that the 
EP could visually see the taxi traffic out the window. 
During Phase Two, indication and alert 
timeliness were evaluated for three different 
detection criteria per scenario, referred to as ‘early’, 
‘mid’, and ’late’ conditions.  The ATCAM 
algorithms were adapted to generate early, mid, or 
late alerting conditions.  For most runway conflict 
scenarios, one of the conditions was similar to 
implementation examples generated as part of the 
ATSA SURF IA application description [10].  In 
addition, a directive alert was evaluated per scenario. 
The test trials were grouped by scenario, with 
the early, mid, and late conditions flown first (with 
experimental ordering), followed by the directive 
alert trial.  The scenarios were given to the flight 
crews in different order.  During the Phase 2 test 
trials, the EPs were asked to continue the maneuver 
until the warning alert was received for evaluation 
purposes.  These test trials were conducted in low 
visibility (1200 ft RVR) without winds.  The 
effectiveness of indications and alerts were evaluated 
through EP subjective ratings and comments and 
quantitative performance comparisons. 
Procedure 
Each EP participated in a briefing and training 
session prior to data collection.  The EP was trained 
on the conflict alerting concept using scenarios 
different from those used during data collection.  The 
EP was not required to take action when an indication 
or caution alert was issued.  For a warning alert, the 
EP was trained to abort during departure, go-around 
on approach, and stop during taxi.  For a directive 
alert, the EP was trained to take the action specified.   
Before each trial, the pilots were briefed on the 
operation (approach, departure, or taxi), any required 
maneuvering constraints (e.g., taxi at 15 kts), and if a 
directive alert was to be provided.  The EPs were not 
made aware of the alerting condition (early, mid, or 
late) prior to those trials.  Post-trial, post-block, and 
post-test questionnaires were administered.  Audio, 
video, and digital data were also recorded. 
Results 
A summary of quantitative and qualitative 
results is presented for both testing phases.  All data 
is referenced from the own-ship center-of-gravity 
(CG), unless noted otherwise. 
Phase One Testing 
The first off-nominal test trial was the taxi/taxi 
conflict scenario.  Unfortunately, the conflicting 
traffic was too easily noticed out the window.  For 
the 9 trials in which alerting was given to the flight 
crew, 3 crews had already seen the traffic out the 
window and slowed or stopped before an alert was 
generated; 4 crews received a caution alert and 
slowed or stopped before receiving a warning alert; 1 
crew was taxiing at a faster pace (23 kts) and 
received a warning alert but saw the traffic out the 
window before receiving the alert; and, 1 crew taxied 
on the wrong taxiway and missed the conflict event.  
For the 9 crews that did not get alerts, all saw the 
traffic out the window and slowed or stopped until 
the taxiing traffic was clear.  The pre-test scenario 
check-out did not sufficiently represent operational 
crew procedures and scanning so this trial did not 
yield the expected data. 
The second off-nominal test trial was the air-to-
air scenario.  When alerts were provided, all 9 crews 
were alerted to the helicopter and were able to avoid 
a possible collision.  When alerts were not provided, 
3 of 9 crews were completely unaware of the conflict 
and did not make a maneuver to avoid the traffic.  
These crews had the map set at the lowest scale and 
traffic was not shown until within 0.5 nm of own-
ship.  The other 6 crews saw the traffic on the map 
when the own-ship was 1 nm or more from the 
traffic.  Even so, only 2 of the 6 crews conducted a 
go-around in enough time to safely avoid a collision.  
The other 4 crews either seemed unsure of the action 
desired by the researcher, were waiting for an alert, 
or thought the traffic was not a factor.  An 
implementation issue that may have affected pilot 
action was that relative altitude was not always 
displayed with the traffic symbol and the flight crew 
did not know how close the traffic was vertically.  In 
future implementations, it is necessary to display 
relative altitude for airborne traffic. 
The third off-nominal test trial was the roll-
out/taxi runway scenario.  When alerts were not 
provided, 7 of 9 crews did not see the traffic cross 
down the runway.  They still stopped prior to the 
incurring aircraft, but their lack of awareness was 
troubling.  When alerts were provided, the EPs 
braked more aggressively.  As a result, the own-ship 
came an average of 680 ft closer to the traffic when 
alerts were not provided.  
The final off-nominal trial evaluated pilot 
response to a nuisance alert.  Eight of the crews that 
received the alert aborted the departure immediately 
after the alert was received.  One crew observed the 
situation and noted the runway was clear and 
continued the departure.  All 9 crews that did not 
receive alerts continued the departure without 
noticing the incorrect CDTI traffic display.  (In this 
case, the traffic was behind the hold line out-the-
window.)  The results suggest that a pilot is prone to 
act upon a warning alert without secondary 
confirmation, especially in a high dynamic maneuver 
like departure; therefore, maintaining a low nuisance 
alert rate is critical to avoiding unnecessary 
maneuvers.  However, the results also demonstrate 
that CDTI alone is not necessarily sufficient for 
conflict avoidance because flight crews may not be 
scanning the displays during high workload 
conditions or when they are mostly head-out, like 
during departure.  The aural alerting component 
provided the flight crews with a glaring attentional 
component in this conflict scenario. 
Phase Two Testing 
All trials conducted during Phase Two testing 
included conflict events; however, the EPs were not 
made aware of the type of conflict prior to the initial 
trial for each scenario type.  Data were only collected 
for 17 flight crews due to a simulator malfunction. 
Results by Scenario 
Each flight crew conducted 40 test trials (680 
total for all crews).  The results are presented by 
scenario. 
The timeliness of indications and alerts were 
rated on a scale of 1 to 7 with 1 being “too early,” 4 
being “just right,” and 7 being “too late.”  The 
usefulness of the alerts were rated on a scale of 1 to 7 
with 1 being “completely useless” and 7 being 
“completely useful.”  Ratings for other queries were 
based on a 7 point scale with 1 equivalent to “low” 
and 7 equivalent to “high.”  Means and standard 
deviations (SD) are presented for all subjects. 
Runway Scenario - Arrival / take-off hold  
A TI was not displayed for this scenario.  During 
51 trials (102 EP ratings), only 55 EPs (53.9 percent) 
correctly identified a TI was not displayed. 
A RSI was displayed and reported to occur in a 
timely manner and was useful (Table 1).  Of 102 EP 
ratings, 76 EPs (74.5 percent) correctly identified a 
RSI was displayed. 
The caution alert was reported to be timely and 
useful (Table 1).  The caution alert timing was not 
varied for this scenario. 
A Friedman two-way non-parametric analysis of 
variance by rank, with post-hoc adjustment, revealed 
that the early warning alert condition was statistically 
preferred for timeliness (p = 0.045) and also rated 
best for timeliness of collision avoidance.  No 
statistical differences were found between early 
warning alert and RSI or caution alert for timeliness.  
All warning alert timings were rated as being useful 
and were not statistically different from each other.  
The late condition mimicked the ATSA SURF IA 
criteria. 
 
Table 1.  Indication and Alert Data for Arrival / Take-off Hold Runway Scenario 
Type Distance 
to Traffic 
(nm) 
Time to 
Impact 
(seconds) 
Own-ship 
AFL 
(feet) 
Timeliness 
preference 
(mean / SD) 
Timeliness 
for avoidance 
(mean / SD) 
Usefulness 
(mean / SD) 
RSI 3.0 Not available 951 4.1 / 0.4 N/A 6.4 / 0.8 
Caution 1.4 35 419 4.3 / 0.6 N/A 6.5 / 0.7 
Warning – Early 1.1 27 325 4.5 / 0.8 4.0 / 0.4 6.6 / 0.6 
Warning – Mid 0.8 20 235 5.2 / 1.0 4.6 / 0.8 6.5 / 0.8 
Warning - Late 0.6 15 180 5.6 / 1.0 4.8 / 0.8 6.3 / 1.1 
Runway Scenario – Departure / taxi  
Neither a TI, RSI, nor a caution alert were 
generated for this scenario.  For the 51 trials, all EPs 
(100 percent) were aware that indications and a 
caution were not provided. 
The mid warning alert condition was preferred 
for timeliness; however, the late condition was 
indicated to provide slightly better timing for 
collision avoidance and was rated slightly more 
useful (Table 2).  The differences are not statistically 
significant (p > 0.05), however.  ATSA SURF IA 
example criteria was not used for any conditions but 
would be similar to the early condition.  Interestingly, 
alerts may be inhibited above 80 kts based on 
proposed ATSA SURF IA requirements, but these 
data indicate that the late condition, occurring on 
average at 84 kts, was not problematic. 
Runway Scenario - Taxi / departure  
For this scenario, it is important to note that the 
distance from the runway centerline to the runway 
edge is 75 ft, the distance from the runway edge to 
the hold line is 290 ft, and the distance from the own-
ship CG to the nose is 73 ft.  The EP was asked to 
taxi the aircraft at 15 kts. 
A TI was generated for this scenario in a timely 
manner (Table 3).  Of 102 EP ratings, 99 EPs (97 
percent) correctly identified a TI was displayed. 
A RSI was generated for the mid and late 
conditions in a timely manner (Table 3).  A RSI was 
not generated for the early condition since a warning 
alert was generated before the RSI criteria were met.  
The RSI was based on ATSA SURF IA criteria.  Of 
102 EP ratings, 68 EPs (66.7 percent) correctly 
identified display of the RSI. 
A caution alert was not generated for this 
scenario. 
The early warning alert condition was rated as 
the most timely by preference and for collision 
avoidance as well as being useful (Table 3).  The 
early warning alert, as shown in Table 3, actually 
occurred before the RSI was scheduled.  The mid 
condition was indicated to be slightly late but still 
very useful.  The late condition was considered way 
too late and marginally useful.  The late condition 
occurred on average after the aircraft cg was well 
over the hold line.  The mid condition mimicked the 
ATSA SURF IA criteria. 
The results of the Friedman test indicated that 
the early warning alert was rated significantly 
preferred for timeliness than the mid and late warning 
alerts (p = 0.023), but no significant differences were 
found between early warning and RSI or caution for 
timeliness or usefulness ratings.  The early warning 
alert was also rated significantly better in terms of 
usefulness than the late warning alert but was non-
significant in comparison to the mid warning alert in 
terms of usefulness. 
Table 2.  Alert Data for Departure / Taxi Runway Scenario 
Type Distance 
to Traffic 
(feet) 
Time to 
Impact 
(seconds) 
Own-ship 
Ground 
Speed (kts) 
Timeliness 
preference 
(mean / SD) 
Timeliness 
for avoidance 
(mean / SD) 
Usefulness 
(mean / SD) 
Warning – Early 5,146 24 39 3.4 / 1.0 3.4 / 0.7 6.4 / 1.0 
Warning – Mid 4,845 21 65 4.2 / 0.8 3.8 / 0.6 6.5 / 0.7 
Warning - Late 4,474 18 84 4.7 / 0.8 4.0 / 0.6 6.7 / 0.5 
Table 3.  Indication and Alert Data for Taxi / Departure Runway Scenario 
Type Distance from 
hold line (feet) 
Timeliness preference 
(mean / SD) 
Timeliness for 
avoidance (mean / SD) 
Usefulness 
(mean / SD) 
TI 630 4.0 / 0.3 N/A 6.8 / 0.5 
RSI 86 4.3 / 0.5 N/A 6.7 / 0.7 
Warning – Early 149 4.2 / 0.4 4.1 / 0.3 6.9 / 0.3 
Warning – Mid -15 5.5 / 0.8 5.2 / 0.7 6.5 / 1.1 
Warning - Late -113 6.7 / 0.5 6.3 / 0.9 4.1 / 2.3 
 
It is interesting to note that all EPs commented 
there was plenty of time to stop with the early 
condition.  For the mid condition, 2 crews did not 
think there was sufficient time to stop and sped 
across the runway and 2 other crews just continued 
across.  (On average, the mid condition alerted when 
the nose of the aircraft had just crossed the hold line.)  
For the late condition, 9 crews quickly tried to cross 
the runway stating that the alert was very late.  On 
average, the late condition happened when the 
aircraft cg was 113 ft past the hold but the aircraft 
nose was still short of the runway edge line. 
Runway Scenario – Roll-out / taxi  
Neither a TI, RSI, nor a caution alert were 
generated for this scenario.  One test crew (2 EPs) did 
not know if a TI, RSI, or caution were generated for 
this scenario.  All other EPs were aware that 
indications and a caution were not provided. 
All conditions were rated timely and useful 
(Table 4) with negligible, non-significant differences 
found (p > 0.05).  The warning alert timing did not 
vary that much between the early (i.e., traffic crossed 
hold line), mid (i.e., traffic 100 ft over hold line), and 
late (i.e., traffic crossed runway edge) conditions. 
The early condition mimicked the ATSA SURF IA 
criteria.  
Runway Scenario - Departure / departure 
intersecting runway  
Neither a TI, RSI, nor a caution alert were 
generated for this scenario. Of 102 EP ratings, 95 EPs 
(93.1 percent) correctly identified a TI was not 
displayed, 101 EPs (99 percent) correctly identified a 
RSI was not displayed, and 100 EPs (98 percent) 
correctly identified a caution alert was not displayed. 
The warning alert was generated when the 
conflict traffic was traveling greater than 30 kts for 
the early condition, 60 kts for the mid condition, and 
90 kts for the late condition. The mid alert condition 
was rated most timely over the early and late 
conditions (Table 5).  The differences were not 
statistically significant, however (p > 0.05).  Neither 
alerting criteria mimicked the ATSA SURF IA 
criteria. 
Taxi Scenario – Traffic ahead  
Indications were not evaluated for taxiway 
conflicts during this study.  The timing was varied for 
both the caution and warning alerts for the taxiway 
conflict scenarios. 
For both caution (p = 0.031) and warning (p = 
0.034) alerts, the early condition was significantly 
preferred for timeliness preference.  The results also 
suggest that pilots considered the early conditions, 
for both caution and warning, as most useful (Table 
6), but the Friedman Test results were non-significant 
(p > 0.05).  The mid condition, while not preferred 
for timeliness was still nearly as timely for collision 
avoidance as the early condition. 
 
 
Table 4.  Alert Data for Roll-out / Taxi Runway Scenario 
Type Distance 
to Traffic 
(feet) 
Time to 
Impact 
(seconds) 
Own-ship 
Ground 
Speed (kts) 
Timeliness 
preference 
(mean / SD) 
Timeliness 
for avoidance 
(mean / SD) 
Usefulness 
(mean / SD) 
Warning – Early 3,363 24 125 4.1 / 0.6 4.1 / 0.6 6.7 / 0.9 
Warning – Mid 2,965 20 113 4.0 / 0.4 3.9 / 0.4 6.7 / 0.5 
Warning - Late 2,511 19 101 4.2 / 0.4 4.2 / 0.5 6.8 / 0.4 
Table 5.  Alert Data for Departure / Departure Runway Scenario 
Type Distance 
to Impact 
(feet) 
Time to 
Impact 
(seconds) 
Own-ship 
Ground 
Speed (kts) 
Timeliness 
preference 
(mean / SD) 
Timeliness for 
avoidance 
(mean / SD) 
Usefulness 
(mean / SD) 
Warning – Early 5,036 18 33 3.8 / 0.6 3.4 / 0.8 6.4 / 1.4 
Warning – Mid 4,761 12 57 4.0 / 0.6 3.8 / 0.4 6.2 / 1.2 
Warning - Late 4,180 8 88 4.9 / 1.0 4.4 / 0.6 6.5 / 1.0 
Table 6.  Alert Data for Traffic Ahead Taxi Scenario 
Type Distance to 
Traffic (feet) 
Time to Traffic 
(seconds) 
Timeliness 
preference 
(mean / SD) 
Timeliness for 
avoidance 
(mean / SD) 
Usefulness 
(mean / SD) 
Caution – Early 495 19 4.2 / 0.4 N/A 6.7 / 0.6 
Caution – Mid 397 15 4.6 / 0.7 N/A 6.5 / 0.7 
Caution – Late 319 12 5.4 / 0.8 N/A 5.7 / 1.6 
Warning – Early 354 13 4.2 / 0.5 4.0 / 0.5 6.7 / 0.5 
Warning – Mid 256 10 4.7 / 0.7 4.4 / 0.6 6.6 / 0.7 
Warning - Late 185 7 5.9 / 0.6 5.3 / 0.7 5.8 / 1.5 
 
Table 7.  Alert Data for Traffic Head-on Taxi Scenario 
Type Distance to 
Impact (feet) 
Time to Impact 
(seconds) 
Timeliness 
preference 
(mean / SD) 
Timeliness for 
avoidance 
(mean / SD) 
Usefulness 
(mean / SD) 
Caution – Early 658 16 3.8 / 0.5 N/A 6.6 / 0.7 
Caution – Mid 424 13 4.2 / 0.6 N/A 6.7 / 0.5 
Caution – Late 317 9 4.6 / 0.7 N/A 6.4 / 0.9 
Warning – Early 436 14 3.7 / 0.8 3.8 / 0.5 6.7 / 0.5 
Warning – Mid 223 9 4.4 / 0.5 4.2 / 0.6 6.7 / 0.5 
Warning - Late 120 6 5.2 / 1.0 4.7 / 0.9 6.2 / 1.0 
 
Table 8.  Alert Data for Taxi / Taxi Scenario 
Type Distance to 
Traffic (feet) 
Time to Traffic 
(seconds) 
Timeliness 
preference 
(mean / SD) 
Timeliness for 
avoidance 
(mean / SD) 
Usefulness 
(mean / SD) 
Caution – Early 605 36 3.9 / 0.4 N/A 6.7 / 0.8 
Caution – Mid 360 23 4.9 / 0.8 N/A 6.0 / 1.1 
Caution – Late 314 20 5.4 / 1.0 N/A 5.5 / 1.7 
Warning – Early 380 24 4.1 / 0.5 3.9 / 0.4 6.9 / 0.3 
Warning – Mid 224 14 5.1 / 0.9 4.9 / 0.7 6.0 / 1.3 
Warning - Late 152 10 6.1 / 0.7 5.5 / 1.0 4.9 / 1.9 
 
Table 9.  Indication and Alert Data for Air-to-Air Scenario 
Type Distance 
to Impact 
(nm) 
Time to 
Impact 
(seconds) 
Relative 
Altitude 
(feet) 
Timeliness 
preference 
(mean / SD) 
Timeliness 
for avoidance 
(mean / SD) 
Usefulness 
(mean / SD) 
TI 3.0 N/A -920 4.0 / 0.3 N/A 6.6 / 0.7 
Caution 1.4 34 -410 4.4 / 0.8 N/A 6.5 / 0.9 
Warning – Early 1.1 29 -348 4.6 / 0.8 4.2 / 0.7 6.6 / 1.1 
Warning – Mid 0.8 19 -219 5.0 / 1.1 5.0 / 1.1 6.3 / 1.5 
Warning - Late 0.4 9 -93 6.5 / 0.6 6.0 / 0.7 4.8 / 2.0 
 
  
Taxi Scenario – Traffic head-on  
The caution and warning alert timings for the 
early and mid conditions were both rated timely and 
useful (Table 7).  The late condition was only slightly 
degraded for timeliness or utility.  The differences 
did not significantly differ (p > 0.05). 
Taxi Scenario – taxi / taxi  
The caution and warning alerting timing for the 
early condition was rated most timely and useful 
(Table 8).  The results of the Friedman statistical test 
indicated that the early condition for caution (p = 
0.015) and warning (p = 0.001) alerts were rated 
significantly more timely than the late condition.  The 
pattern of results was similar for usefulness ratings, 
wherein pilots rated the early condition for caution (p 
= 0.018) and warning (p = 0.011) significantly more 
useful than the late condition.  For both ratings of 
timeliness and usefulness, pilots did not statistically 
rate the early conditions higher than the mid 
condition (p > 0.05).   
Air-to-air Scenario – Arrival / crossing traffic  
A TI was generated for this scenario in a timely 
manner (Table 9).  A RSI was not applicable since 
this was an air-to-air scenario. 
The caution alert timing was not varied for this 
scenario and was rated timely and useful (Table 9). 
The early warning alerting condition was rated 
slightly, but statistically non-significant, more timely 
and useful than the mid alerting condition (Table 9) 
but was significantly rated more timely (p = 0.021) 
and useful (p = 0.013) than the late condition.  The 
late timing was considered very late and only 
moderately useful.  On average, only 9 seconds 
would be available to maneuver and avoid a collision.  
Qualitative Results 
Post-run and post-test questionnaires were 
administered as appropriate.  Ratings for most of the 
questions were given on a scale of 1 (“strongly 
disagree”, “completely useless”, “low”) to 7 
(“strongly agree”, “completely useful”, “high”).  The 
post-test questionnaire was given to the EPs to fill out 
at their leisure.  Thirty-two of thirty-six possible 
questionnaires were returned. 
Indications 
Indications were found to be helpful in 
determining critical runway safety information (mean 
6.3, SD 0.8) and in determining the location and 
movement of traffic that was relevant to the safety of 
the own-ship (mean 6.3, SD 0.7).  Of 32 EP ratings, 
29 EPs (90.6 percent) responded that indications 
were desired for runway, taxi, and low altitude air-to-
air operations.  The enlarged chevron (mean 5.8, SD 
1.2), indicated runway (blue and white runway 
outline) (mean 5.8, SD 1.6), and chevron outline 
(mean 5.7, SD 1.6) were rated as being the most 
useful for determining relevant traffic.   
During the testing, the EPs were provided with 
images showing the symbology for the various types 
of indications.  Even having that, it was observed that 
there was some confusion when identifying the type 
of indication (TI or RSI).  The EPs indicated that it 
was moderately easy (mean 4.8, SD 1.7) to 
distinguish between the TI and RSI and the way that 
the TI and RSI were differentiated was moderately 
easy (mean 4.9, SD 1.6) to recognize by looking at 
the display. 
Alerts 
Regarding the alert display features, the auditory 
alert (mean 6.0, SD 1.6), indicated runway (yellow or 
red runway outline, mean 6.0, SD 1.5), chevron 
outline (yellow circle/red square, mean 6.0, SD 1.6), 
and enlarged chevron (mean 5.7, SD 1.5) were rated 
as being most useful.  Of 28 EP ratings, 24 EPs (85.7 
percent) responded that the audible alert was most 
likely to bring a conflict situation to their attention. 
During an alert, the distance between the traffic 
and own-ship was displayed as part of the traffic ID 
tag.  The distance information was rated as being 
somewhat useful (mean 5.1, SD 1.6).  The distance 
was displayed in nautical miles when greater than 1 
nm and in feet when below 1 nm.  Of 32 EP ratings, 
24 EPs (75 percent) indicated the presentation was 
clearly understood; however, 15 of 31 EPs (80.6 
percent) indicated another method of presentation, 
such as tenths of a nautical mile instead of feet, 
would be preferred.  When queried whether a 
distance auditory call-out was desirable, of 31 EP 
ratings, 17 EPs (54.8 percent) thought so for low 
altitude air-to-air conflicts, 14 EPs (45.2 percent) 
thought so for runway conflicts, and only 10 EPs 
(32.2. percent) thought so for taxi conflicts. 
On the HUD, a target designator symbol (circle 
for caution, square for warning) was shown during an 
alert that overlaid the conflict traffic out the window.  
The EPs rated this presentation as being effective 
(mean 5.5, SD 1.2) and providing a clear indication 
(mean 5.5, SD 1.3) of the relative location of the 
conflict traffic. 
The alert messages displayed were generic and 
universal (“Caution, Traffic” and “Warning, 
Traffic”).  Of 32 EP ratings, 13 EPs (40.6 percent) 
indicated a more descriptive message, such as 
“Warning, Traffic Departing Runway 10”, would be 
more effective, while 18 EPs (56.2 percent) did not. 
An off-scale symbol was shown when the 
conflict traffic was not in the viewing area on the 
HUD or not shown on the surface map.  The EPs 
rated these off-scale presentations as being effective 
in providing information on the conflict traffic (HUD 
– mean 4.9, SD 1.4, map – mean 5.5, SD 1.2) and 
providing a clear indication of the relative location of 
the conflict traffic (HUD – mean 4.6, SD 1.7, map – 
mean 5.4, SD 1.2).  Of 32 EPs, 19 EPs (59.4 percent) 
would prefer the surface map to auto-zoom to a scale 
that shows the traffic symbol, 11 EPs (34.4 percent) 
would not prefer auto-zoom. 
Latency of Alerting 
In almost all cases, the early alerting conditions 
were preferred by the EPs for timeliness, preference 
for collision avoidance, and usefulness.  These data 
must be viewed in context however.  Certainly earlier 
alerting provides for better crew awareness and 
preparation for contingency planning.  However, 
early alerting typically means more nuisance alerts in 
a viable CD&R system.  The subjective trend data 
between the early, mid, and late alerting conditions 
for timeliness preference for collision avoidance 
perhaps more accurately indicate the tolerance that 
flight crews need to avert collisions.  Further research 
is also required to evaluate the integrated systems 
concepts for indications and alerts. 
Directive Alerting 
In general, the EPs indicated they felt slightly 
safer during runway (mean 6.6, SD 0.6), taxi (mean 
6.7, SD 0.5), and low altitude air-to-air (mean 6.5, 
SD 0.8) incidents when directive alerting was 
provided than when alerts without directives were 
provided (runway – mean 5.3, SD 1.1, taxi – mean 
5.6, SD 1.0, low altitude – mean 5.0, SD 1.4). 
For all scenarios, the directive alert was rated 
very useful (mean 6.6, SD 0.7) and clear in terms of 
the action to take (mean 6.9, mean 0.1).  The 
directive given was rated as being the best choice for 
the situation for most scenarios (mean 6.9, SD 0.4).  
For the Traffic Ahead taxi scenario, a “stop” directive 
was given.  EPs (16 of 34 (47 percent)) indicated 
another directive such as “slow down” or “reduce 
speed” would be more appropriate.  For the low 
altitude air-to-air scenario, a “climb” directive was 
given.  Several EPs (9 of 34 (26.5 percent)) indicated 
“go around” would be more appropriate since the 
aircraft was on final approach. 
The directive alert was rated as being slightly 
more beneficial (mean 6.7, SD 0.7) than a warning 
alert with no directive (mean 5.8, SD 0.7) for all 
scenarios evaluated.  However, ANOVA statistical 
analysis reported that these differences were not 
statistically significant, F(1, 35) = 4.19, p < 0.05. 
For all scenarios, the EPs indicated that their 
level of perceived safety during a similar traffic 
conflict event would be significantly highest if 
directive alerts were provided (mean 6.8, SD 0.4) 
than if warning alerts with no directive (mean 5.9, SD 
0.6) or no alerts at all (mean 3.3, SD 1.2) were 
provided, F(2,35) = 4.78, p < 0.05.  A Student-
Neuman-Keuls test revealed significant difference 
between all three conditions tested. 
The EPs also indicated that directive alerts were 
desired during most types of operations (final 
approach – 27 of 32 EPs (84.4 percent), take-off roll 
– 26 of 32 EPs (81.3 percent), taxiing across a 
runway – 28 of 32 EPs (87.5 percent), low altitude 
air-to-air – 28 of 32 EPs (87.5 percent), and taxiing – 
20 of 31 EPs (64.5 percent)). 
Summary 
A CAAT concept for the airport TMA was 
evaluated in a simulation study.  The purpose of the 
study was to evaluate pilot reaction to conflict events 
in the TMA, multiple alert timings for various 
scenarios, alerting display concepts, and directive 
alerting concepts. 
The data from Phase One testing highlighted the 
importance of designing scenarios carefully to 
emulate testable conditions witnessed in the real-
world.  The surface conflict scenario was designed to 
determine whether or not flight crews would be able 
to detect traffic outside the primary field-of-view.  
Because of significant variability in taxiing speeds 
across crews, the conflict traffic was not consistent 
and the efficacy of the surface conflict monitor could 
not be effectively evaluated. 
The low-altitude conflict scenario demonstrated 
the value of providing alerts below 1000 ft AFL (i.e., 
when TCAS RAs are inhibited).  Without an alerting 
system, data showed that there was an unacceptably 
high propensity for missed detections out-the-
window.  A hybrid alerting system, providing 
seamless coverage of surveillance and conflict 
monitoring, by continuing coverage beyond TCAS to 
the airport surface, including taxi conflicts, would be 
highly beneficial.  With the rapid expansion of ADS-
B and applications, the need for integrated traffic 
conflict alerting systems, that is consistently 
implemented, should be required for NextGEN 
envisaged operations. 
The runway incursion scenarios supported past 
research results demonstrating the significant value 
of alerting systems that can prevent these hazardous 
events.  The data showed that flight crews were not 
able to adequately detect the presence of incursion 
traffic with a cockpit display of traffic information 
without the benefit of the onboard runway incursion 
alerting.  When the system alerted, the flight crews 
were provided with excellent situation awareness of 
the hazard and avoided the traffic.  That said, the 
results further made clear that any such systems 
would need to be highly reliable to avoid false alarms 
and unnecessary go-arounds and rejected take-offs. 
The Phase Two testing provided specific 
feedback on design of the CAAT technologies.  
Flight crews quantitative and qualitative feedback on 
timeliness of alerts, directives, indications, and alert 
display indicated the essential features and needed 
improvements to support the various types of 
operations tested.  Overall, the ATCAM algorithm 
and indications and alerting concepts were well-
received.  Specific data was collected to tailor the 
algorithm performance to optimize the onset and 
symbology display of alerting for the different CAAT 
system monitors.  Finally, the research study 
indicated value for directive alerting but showed the 
need for further evaluation. 
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